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The purpose of the paper is to describe the practice of courts in Canton Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina) with respect to the sanc-
tions for corruption offenses, and to compare it to the relevant legislature. The research encompassed 89 cases (with 108 defendants) 
of trials for corruption at the Municipal and Cantonal court in Sarajevo, in the 2005- 2011 period. The whole population of cases 
was analyzed, and Sarajevo, being a big administrative center, was selected due to the nature of crimes and territorial jurisdiction of 
courts. Research suggests that in more than a half of analyzed cases the defendants were found guilty (N=60). In the vast majority of 
cases (87 %), a suspended sentence was adjudged. Unsuspended imprisonment, which was applied in eight cases, was predominantly 
imposed in duration of six months. In each case, the punishment was determined in duration equal to the lower bound of the sentence 
range, and in three (of eight) cases, punishment was mitigated. Only in four cases the security measure of prohibition to engage in 
a profession, activity or duty, was applied. Community service was applied in none of cases. Therefore, it seems plausible to deduce 
that when rendering a penalty, courts tended to be lenient. Bearing in mind that criminal law is separated from other law branches 
by accentuated punitivity, and that by inadequate application of punishment, the decisiveness of the whole criminal justice system 
declines, it is no surprise that, in the field of criminal and legal response to corruption, Bosnia and Herzegovina does not make good 
progress. Although criminal law is just a portion of the system of social control, it is its important and necessary part, and if not 
applied appropriately, may imply inadequate overall outcomes in the field of anti-corruption activities.
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INRODUCTION
The relevance of study of the problem of 
penal policy in the area of corruption-
related criminal offenses
The	 issues	 of	 penal	 responses	 and	 sanctioning	
of	offenses	have	been	of	great	interest	to	the	schol-
arly	 public,	 the	 experts,	 and	 the	 general	 public,	
accompanied	by	intense	media	attention.	This	topic	
appears	 commonly	 as	 object	 of	 debate	 in	 gather-
ings	 of	 scholars	 and	 experts,	 with	 a	 special	 focus	
of	discussions	on	the	purpose,	implementation	and	
effects	 of	 penal	 responses	 and	 sanctioning	 of	 cor-
ruption-related	criminal	offenses.	Special	 attention	
is	 paid	 to	 the	policy	of	 penal	 responses	 to	 serious	





to	 effectively	 and	 efficiently	 confronts	 crime	 and	
provide	 satisfactory	 compensation	 to	 the	 victims	
of	crime,	by	means	of	applying	and	 threatening	 to	
apply	penal	sanctions.	These	measures	are	realized	
on	 three	 levels:	 legislative,	 judicial,	 and	 execu-





independent	 bodies,	 the	 focus	 is	 on	 courts,	 i.e.	 on	
penal	 policy	 of	 the	 courts,	which	may	 be	 referred	
to	 as	 penal	 policy	 in	 the	 strict	 sense.	 Stojanović	
and	Kolarić	(2010)	thus	point	out	that	penal	policy	
represents	 rational	 and	 practical	 activity	 of	 courts	
in	 the	 areas	 of	 application	 of	 sentences	 and	 other	
available	penal	sanctions	aimed	at	criminal	offend-
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ers.	The	 purpose	 of	 such	 penal	 policy	 is	 reflected	
in	the	attempts	to	make	application	of	penal	codes	
as	 efficient	 as	 possible	 (Zlatarić	 and	 Damaška,	
1966).	This	means	 that	 an	adequate	 sanction	must	






use	 of	 one’s	 position	 in	 order	 to	 further	 private	
interests,	 which	 is	 also	 defined	 as	 a	 crime	 in	 the	
positive	legislation	of	a	socio-political	community.	
Defined	thusly,	the	concept	of	corruption	can	cover	
a	 large	 number	 of	 incriminating	 behaviors,	 but	 in	
this	 paper	we	 are	only	 focusing	on	 the	 “classical”	
corruption	offenses,	which	include	(both	active	and	
passive)	 bribery,	 illegal	 mediation,	 abuse	 of	 posi-
tion	 or	 power,	 embezzlement	 while	 in	 office,	 and	
fraud	while	 in	office.	The	protected	object	 (in	 this	
case,	that	is	 the	proper	conduct	of	official	or	other	
duty,	 where	 official	 duty	 is	 defined	 as	 rights	 and	
obligations	 of	 officials	 that	 are	 aimed	 at	 applying	
their	authority,	as	 it	 is	defined)	and	 the	 intentional	
criminal	 act	with	 the	 aim	 of	 accruing	 benefits,	 be	
they	material	or	not,	are	the	criteria	that	make	these	
the	classical	corruption	offenses




democratic	 traditions	 and	political	 stability,	 turned	
Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	into	perfect	soil	for	corrupt	








top	 of	 the	 penal	 and	 political	 agenda.	Along	with	




additional	 problem	 this	 paper	 deals	 with,	 and	 yet	
another	 argument	 in	 favor	 of	 a	 need	 to	 conduct	
research	in	penal	policy.	
A general view at the legislator’s policy 
towards corruption-related criminal offenses
A	 crime-fighting	 policy	 consists	 of	 a	 totality	
of	 preventive	 and	 repressive	 activities	 which	 are	
initiated,	 implemented	 and/or	 supported	 by	 the	




different	 manifestations	 in	 different	 time	 periods.	
As	 its	 special	 sub-area,	 the	 policy	 of	 punishment	
has	had	 a	dominant	 role	 throughout	 the	history	of	
its	development	(Milutinović,	1984;	Singer,	Kovčo	
Vukadin	 and	 Cajner	Mraović	 2002).	 Penal	 policy	
has	 thus	 always	been	present,	 but	has	 also	 always	
been	 changing,	 depending	 on	 the	 socio-economic	
and	 cultural	 development	 of	 a	 society,	 and	 on	
the	 extent	 on	 class	 oppositions	 and	 class	 struggle	
(Srzentić,	Stajić	i	Lazarević,	1998).	
The	 definition	 of	 a	 criminal	 offense	 depends	
on	 attitudes	 in	 a	 society,	 more	 precisely,	 on	 the	
attitudes	of	the	ruling	class.	Additionally,	their	atti-
tudes	define	the	extent	of	threatened	legal	sanctions	
aimed	 at	 the	 offenders	 of	 particular	 criminal	 acts,	
as	defined	in	penal	codes.	All	criminal	offenses	or	
felonies	 may	 be	 categorized	 as	 lesser,	 moderate,	
serious,	and	very	serious	(Cvitanović,	1999).	Lesser	
felonies	 are	 those	 for	 which	 the	 maximum	 legal	
punishment	 does	 not	 exceed	 3	 years	 of	 imprison-
ment,	 while	 the	 moderate	 ones	 carry	 a	 maximum	
penalty	 of	 5	 years	 of	 imprisonment.	The	 category	
of	serious	criminal	offenses	is	made	up	of	those	for	
which	 the	 law	 prescribes	 a	maximum	 punishment	
of	up	 to	10	years’	 imprisonment.	Finally,	 the	very	
serious	 criminal	 offenses	 are	 those	 for	 which	 the	









Currently,	 imprisonment	 is,	 at	 least	 in	 Europe,	 the	

























seriousness	 of	 criminal	 acts	 of	 corruption	 is	 more	
than	obvious	in	relation	to	all	criminal	offenses.	
Along	with	 the	provisions	concerning	 the	 threat	
of	imprisonment,	the	provisions	concerning	fines	in	
the	 penal	 code	 are	 also	worthy	 of	 comment.	 Thus	
article	41	of	the	Penal	Code	of	Federation	of	Bosnia	
and	Herzegovina	 (until	 the	 2010	 changes)	 foresaw	




ticular	 offense.	Additionally,	 acts	 of	 corruption	 are	
singled	 out	 by	 the	 legislation	 insofar	 as	 they	 carry	
a	 potential	 of	 fines	much	 higher	 (up	 to	 1	 000	 000	
BAM,	 or	more	 in	 exceptional	 cases)	 than	 in	 other	
cases	(where	the	fine	cannot	exceed	100	000	BAM).	
With	 all	 of	 these	 factors	 taken	 into	 account,	






In	 order	 to	 keep	 the	 penal	 policy	 efficient	 and	
appropriate	for	the	society,	the	legislative	and	judicial	
policies	 must	 “keep	 up	 the	 pace”	 and	 function	 in	 a	
synchronized	 manner	 (Ignjatović,	 2005;	 Stojanović,	
2012).	Related	to	that	Ancel	(1960)	notes	that	the	pur-
pose	of	crime-fighting	policy	is	not	the	establishment	
of	 an	 abstract	 legal	 order,	 but	 a	 concrete	 protection	
of	 society	 from	 crime.	 Even	 though	 the	 problem	 of	
abstract	weight	or	 seriousness	of	criminal	offenses	 is	
discussed	by	numerous	authors,	who	state	that	the	issue	
of	 legislative	 penal	 policy	 is	 contentious	 (Ashworth,	
2007,	Cvitanović,	1999,	Johnstone,	2000,	Milutinović,	








Bearing	 in	mind	 the	fact	 that	crimes	of	corrup-
tion	 are	 similar	 across	 countries,	 a	 specific	 reac-
tion	to	these	crimes	may	be	expected	from	various	
judicial	institutions.	This	is	confirmed	by	empirical	
research	 in	Western	Europe,	 in	 our	 region,	 and	 in	
Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	as	well.	
A	 report	 by	Aebi	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 in	 the	 European	
Crime	 and	 Judicial	Statistics	Review	 states	 that	 sus-
Table	1 The weight of criminal offenses of corruption, as prescribed in the Penal Code of the Federation of Bosnia and 
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pended	sentences	are	 the	most	common	sanction	 for	
the	 criminal	 acts	 of	 corruption	 (appearing	 in	 around	
a	half	of	the	cases),	while	unsuspended	imprisonment	











a	 seal	 on	 the	 bribe-giver’s	 travel	 document.	 The	
Bannenberg	 research	 project	 in	 Federal	 Republic	 of	
Germany	showed	that,	out	of	a	total	of	436	defendants	
in	208	criminal	processes,	about	one	fifth	were	found	
guilty	 (1.8%	were	 fined,	 and	 16%	 of	 all	 defendants	
were	 sentenced	 to	 prison).	 In	 nearly	 30%	 of	 cases,	
however,	there	was	no	information	about	the	outcome	




of	cases	 in	which	 there	had	been	verdicts,	 imprison-
ment	was	by	far	 the	most	common	sanction	(in	nine	
out	of	10	cases).	In	a	bit	more	than	half	of	the	cases	
a	 prison	 sentence	 under	 two	 years	 had	 been	 issues,	












but	 only	 in	 5%	 of	 cases	 outside	 the	 economy.	 The	









and	 Tanjević	 (2010)	 report	 on	 the	 disproportions	
between	 the	 prescribed	 sentences	 in	 the	 Republic	
of	 Serbia’s	 Penal	 Code,	 and	 the	 actually	 handed	
sentences	 to	 the	 offenders,	 in	 cases	 of	 corruption.	
Đorđević	 (2012)	 finds	 that	 the	prison	 sentences	 in	
these	cases	are	often	below	the	legal	minimum,	that	
the	fines	for	offenders	are	exceptions,	as	are	security	
measures,	 which	 only	 appear	 in	 about	 5%	 of	 the	
cases.	Ignjatović	(2005)	points	out	that,	even	though	
it	is	extremely	important	for	prevention	of	crimes	of	
corruption	 committed	 by	 officials,	 the	measure	 of	
ban	of	working	in	a	profession,	activity,	or	function	
is	only	applied	in	exceptional	cases,	and	is	the	least	
applied	measure	of	 all.	 In	 a	 somewhat	older	piece	
Peković	(2001)	states	that,	in	the	Republic	of	Serbia,	




of	 all	 cases.	Mrčela,	 Novosel	 and	 Rogić-Hadžalić	
(2012)	 reported	 that,	 in	 the	 Republic	 of	 Croatia,	
in	 the	2008-2010	period,	 suspended	 sentences	had	
been	 issued	 for	 slightly	 less	 than	 two	 thirds	of	 the	
cases,	while	 the	 sentence	 to	 prison	was	 applied	 in	
slightly	more	than	one	third	of	the	cases.	In	one	in	
three	 cases,	 the	 benefit	 gained	 by	 corruption	 was	
confiscated	from	the	persons	found	guilty.	
Mujanović	 (2011)	 states	 that	 in	 Bosnia	 and	
Herzegovina,	 the	 sentences	 for	 criminal	 offenses	 of	
corruption	 are	being	 issued	much	 closer	 to	 the	 legal	
minimum.	 Datzer	 (2012)	 reports	 that	 for	 criminal	
offense	of	bribery	are	punished	by	suspended	sentences	
(for	about	two	thirds	of	perpetrators,	with	the	average	
length	 of	monitoring	 of	 1.8	 years),	while	 the	 unsus-

















immediately	 reported	 the	offense	and	demanded	 that	
the	offered	money	be	 temporarily	 removed	 from	 the	
person.	The	latter	is	particularly	important,	as	objects	
gained	 through	 bribery	 or	 which	 served	 in	 order	 to	
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bribe	 are	 obligatorily	 and	 permanently	 confiscated,	
thus	providing	a	reasonable	explanation	for	 the	large	




Even	 though	 the	 conclusions	 are	 at	 the	 level	 of	
















foreseen	 by	 the	 legislator	 for	 criminal	 offenses	 or	




guided	 the	 court	 in	 the	 decision-making	 process,	
and	the	level	of	gains	achieved	by	the	criminal	act.	











this	 paper	 is	 based	 on	 the	 assumption	 that,	 when	
choosing	the	type	and	extent	of	sanction	in	the	area	
of	 criminal	 offenses	 of	 corruption,	 the	 courts	 are	
characterized	by	application	of	low	levels	of	repres-






concerns	 judicial	 practice,	 and	 it	 states	 that	 the	 per-
petrators	of	criminal	offenses	of	corruption	are	rarely	
facing	major	penal	 sanctions	 (punishments),	and	 that	
even	when	these	are	issues,	they	are	closer	to	the	legal	
minimum,	or	when	provisions	concerning	extenuating	




courts	are	 trying	 to	fulfill	 the	purpose	of	punishment	




available	 as	 options	when	 deciding	 on	 sanctions	 are	
rarely	issued	to	the	offenders	in	the	area	of	corruption.	
METHODS












and	 Cantonal	 courts	 in	 Sarajevo.	 The	 decision	 to	
limit	 the	 analysis	 to	 Sarajevo	 alone	 stems	 from	
the	 fact	 that	 Sarajevo	 is	 the	 capital	 of	Bosnia	 and	
Herzegovina,	a	city	which	is	the	administrative	cen-
ter,	 and	 the	 seat	 of	numerous	municipal,	 cantonal,	
entity	 and	 state	 institutions.	Given	 that	 corruption	
presupposes	 the	 perpetrator	 to	 have	 an	 official	
position	 or	 similar	 position	 of	 responsibility,	 it	 is	
reasonable	to	expect	that	these	courts,	with	jurisdic-
tion	 for	 the	 Sarajevo	 area,	 would	 also	 be	 dealing	
with	the	bulk	of	cases	in	the	area	of	corruption.	This	
is	indicated	by	the	data	from	the	High	Judicial	and	
Prosecutors’	 Council	 of	 Bosnia	 and	 Herzegovina	
as	well,	which	state	 that,	 in	 the	2009-2011	period,	
the	Cantonal	Prosecutor’s	Office	 in	Sarajevo	 initi-
ated	the	largest	number	of	indictments	for	criminal	
offenses	 of	 corruption,	 while	 the	 corresponding	
courts	passed	the	largest	number	of	verdicts	in	that	
area	 of	 law,	when	 compared	 to	 the	 other	 prosecu-
tors’	offices	and	courts	in	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina.	
The	 data	 presented	 and	 discussed	 here	 were	
acquired	 as	 part	 of	 a	 wider	 research	 project,	 con-
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the	 courts	 that	 the	project	was	 conducted	 in.	After	




delivered	 the	 full	 list	of	cases.	For	 that	 reason,	 the	





bers	 have	 matched,	 indicating	 that	 the	 researcher	
could	commence	the	analysis	of	individual	cases.	
Since	this	paper	 is	aimed	at	 the	penal	policy	in	
the	 area	 of	 corruption-related	 criminal	 offenses	 in	
the	 Sarajevo	 Canton,	 the	 analysis	 included	 all	 of	
the	 lawfully	 concluded	 corruption	 cases	 that	were	
available	in	the	courts	that	had	the	jurisdiction	in	the	
area,	 for	 the	period	 starting	 January	1st	2005,	 and	
ending	 on	December	 31st	 2011.	 Since	 a	 five-year	
period	 is	 generally	 considered	 a	 sufficiently	 long	









For	 the	 purpose	 of	 data	 acquisition,	 the	 original	
database	form	was	used,	created	especially	for	 the	
purposes	of	the	project	at	hand.	
The	 unit	 of	 analysis	 is	 a	 verdict,	 meaning	 a	
judicial	 decision	 that	 discusses	 the	 penal	 demand	
as	expressed	in	the	indictment.	Data	referring	to	50	
categories	 were	 analyzed	 in	 each	 of	 the	 verdicts,	
and	 these	 categories	 were	 grouped	 into	 11	 areas,	
listed	 here	 as	 follows:	 information	 regarding	 the	




activities	 of	 provision	 of	 evidence	 in	 the	 process,	
the	 sanctioning,	 the	 determined	 penal	 sanction,	
procedure	 for	 legal	 remedies.	 Coding	 and	 noting	
of	the	data	were	not	a	problem,	since	the	decisions	
of	 the	 courts	 are	 precise	 and	 clear,	 in	 content	 and	







so	 clear	 and	because	 the	 content	was	 so	manifest,	
there	was	no	need	to	hire	additional	researchers	for	
the	purpose	of	assessment	of	consistency	of	coding.	
These	 procedures	 are	 standard	 in	 content	 analysis	
of	 other	 materials	 (e.g.	 media	 content,	 newspaper	
articles,	and	similar)	 (Bachman	and	Schutt,	2007),	
but	 this	 is	not	 the	case	 in	analysis	of	adjudication.	
Hagan	(2005)	takes	the	position	that	the	coding	of	
data	ought	 to	be	 split	 among	 several	 coders	 if	 the	
analyzed	 materials	 are	 bulky,	 which	 was	 not	 the	
case	in	our	project.	
We	used	 the	 analysis	of	 frequencies	 as	method	






those,	 62	 cases	 came	 from	 the	 Municipal	 Court	
in	 Sarajevo,	 and	 27	 from	 the	 Cantonal	 Court	 in	
Sarajevo.	 As	 several	 persons	 may	 be	 indicted	 in	
each	of	 the	cases,	 the	structure	of	 the	verdicts	and	
sentences	ought	to	be	represented	in	relation	to	the	
total	 number	 of	 persons	 against	 which	 these	 pro-
ceedings	were	held	(Table	2).
Table	2 Lawful verdicts and decisions for persons indic-
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of	 indicted	 persons	 the	 cases	 were	 halted,	 or	 the	
indictments	were	altered.	When	it	comes	to	altered	
indictments,	 we	 should	 point	 out	 that	 those	 have	
























Bearing	 in	mind	 that	 the	 intent	of	 the	perpetra-
tor	is	to	acquire	some	sort	of	gain,	most	commonly	




cases).	The	 average	 value	 of	 these	 illegal	 gains	 is	
more	 than	 25	 000	 BAM.	The	minimal	 amount	 of	
illegal	gain	was	around	600	BAM,	while	the	high-
est	recorded	amount	was	slightly	more	than	120	000	




Though	 similar,	 each	 of	 the	 acts	 of	 corruption	
bears	 its	own	specificities.	Thus	 it	makes	 sense	 to	
consider	 the	data	 from	 the	previous	passages	with	
regard	to	particular	crimes	(Table	3).	
Table	 3	 indicates	 that	 the	 lowest	 overall	 gains	
were	acquired	by	means	of	illegal	mediation,	while	
the	 largest	 came	 from	embezzlement.	Besides,	 the	
average	 value	 gained	 through	 embezzlement	 (as	








Graph	 1	 clearly	 indicates	 that	 the	 perpetrators	 of	
crimes	of	corruption	were	sentenced	to	prison	in	slight-
ly	more	 than	one	eighth	of	 the	cases,	while	 in	others	
(nearly	87%)	this	major	penal	sanction	was	not	applied.	



















Mean	 2.100,00 700,00 59.108,89 20.551,28 1.252,01
Minimum 2.000,00 700,00 1.871,92 600,88 908,39
Maximum 2.200,00 700,00 119.921,23 120.075,30 1.595,70




6 12 18 36
380.	Par.1 12-120 1* - - - 1
380.	Par.2 6-60 1 - - - 1
383.	Par.3 At	least	36 - - 1* 1 2
384.	Par.2 12-120 1* 3 - - 4
Total	 3 3 1 1 8
*Sentences	applied	by	the	courts	which	are	under	legal	minimum
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tencing,	it	is	clear	that	all	the	sentences	of	imprison-
ment	applied	by	the	courts	in	these	cases	have	been	
at	 the	 legal	minimum	or	below	 it.	More	precisely,	
three	out	 of	 eight	 applied	 sentences	have	been	 set	
below	 the	 legal	 minimum,	 and	 that	 the	 minimal	















cases	 each).	The	 courts	 listed	 inculpatory	 circum-
stances	 in	 just	 three	verdicts,	with	 each	one	being	
applied	 to	 a	 different	 perpetrator,	 all	 concerning	
the	means	of	acquiring	illegal	gains,	and	the	intent	
with	 which	 the	 acts	 were	 committed.	 These	 data	
are	based	on	seven	verdicts	only,	since	one	of	them	
does	 not	 list	 any	 special	 circumstances	 that	 were	
taken	into	consideration	during	the	measuring	of	the	
type	and	extent	of	the	applied	sentence.	
Data on other penal sanctions













the	 legal	 minimum.	 It	 should	 also	 be	 particularly	













When	 selecting	 a	 legal	 sanction	 (in	 cases	 of	
suspended	sentences),	the	following	extenuating	cir-
cumstances	 were	 most	 commonly	 considered:	 no	















3 4 6 7 8 10 12 16 18 24 36
381.	Par.1. 6-60 - - - 2 - 1 - 1 - - - - 4
381.	Par.2. Do	36 - 1 1 - - - - - - - - - 2
383.	Par.1. 6-60 - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1
383.	Par.2. 12-120 - - - 1* - - 1* 1 - - - - 3
383.	Par.3. At	least	36 - - - - - - - 1* - - 3* - 4
384.	Par.1. 6-60 1* 3* 1* 5 4 3 - 3 - 1 - - 21
384.	Par.2. 12-120 - - - - - - 1* 7 1 2 - - 11
384.	Par.3. At	least	36 - - - - - - - 1* - 2* - 1 4
385.	Par.1. 6-60 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - - 2
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occasions	the	circumstance	was	that	of	the	perpetra-
tor’s	 prior	 criminal	 conviction.	 These	 findings	 are	
drawn	from	40	cases,	as	the	courts	listed	no	extenuat-
ing	or	inculpating	circumstances	in	the	remaining	12.	





tion	of	 the	sentence,	 the	courts	 listed	 the	existence	
of	extenuating	circumstances.	These	circumstances,	
however,	have	typically	been	“regular”	circumstanc-
es	 as	 prescribed	 in	 the	 provisions	 on	 sentencing,	
which	have	been	interpreted	by	courts	as	“extraor-
dinary”,	i.e.	extenuating.	Typical	examples	of	these	




Our	 results	 show	 that	 security	 measures	 were	
applied	in	just	4	of	the	60	cases,	i.e.	less	than	7%.	
It	ought	to	be	noted	that	the	measure	of	ban	on	tak-
ing	 part	 in	 a	 profession,	 activity,	 or	 function	 was	











Penal	 policy	 is	 an	 extremely	 important	 social	
factor,	one	that	is	more	commonly	debated	by	rep-
resentative	bodies	and	bodies	of	social	and	political	
organizations	 than	any	other	 issue	of	 criminal	 law	
(Horvatić,	 1980).	 The	 impact	 of	 these	 bodies	 has	
been	 formative	 of	 judicial	 penal	 policy	 for	 more	
than	 a	 century,	 guiding	 it	 mostly	 towards	 a	 more	




cial	policy	of	punishment	 for	 acts	of	 corruption	 is	
characterized	by	an	application	of	a	small	measure	
of	 repression.	The	 results	 of	 our	 research	 confirm	
this	hypothesis.	
First	of	all,	 the	previous	section	shows	 that	 the	
perpetrators	 of	 criminal	 offenses	 of	 corruption	
are	 rarely	 handed	 major	 (unsuspended)	 penal	
sanctions	 (imprisonment	 and	 fines).	 The	 extent	
of	 avoidance	 of	 such	 sanctions	 can	 best	 be	 seen	
in	 the	 fact	 that	 similar	 sanctions	are	being	applied	
to	 perpetrators	 of	 the	 lesser	 and	 the	 most	 serious	
acts	of	corruption,	even	though	the	latter	is	strictly	
banned	by	the	penal	code.	Our	results	confirm	those	
of	 Datzer	 (2012),	Maljević	 (2011),	 but	 also	 those	
of	 Đorđević	 (2012),	 and	 Stojanović	 and	 Kolarić	
(2010).	This	 could	 lead	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	




of	 the	 cases	 of	 these	 felonies,	 e.g.	 the	 facts	 could	
point	 to	 the	 cases	 being	 those	 of	 lesser	 felonies.	
However,	bearing	 in	mind	 that	 the	acts	committed	
in	the	cases	seen	by	the	courts	have	nearly	all	been	
committed	 with	 direct	 intent,	 were	 motivated	 by	
personal	gain,	along	with	rather	large	average	gains	
that	 were	 realized	 by	 means	 of	 corruption	 (aver-
age	value	of	25	000	BAM,	as	above),	this	potential	
explanation	 is	not	grounded	 in	 fact,	or	at	 least	not	
firmly	grounded	in	fact.	Another	reason	for	the	rare	
application	of	punishments	could	be	the	knowledge	
of	 their	 effects.	 Namely,	 Kovčo	 (2001)	 discusses	
the	 negative	 effects	 of	 imprisonment,	 and	 argu-
ing	 in	 favor	 of	 their	 replacement	 with	 alternative	




of	numerous	 issues	 regarding	determination	of	 the	
extent	 of	 a	 fine,	 its	 effect,	 and	 the	 possibility	 that	
the	perpetrator	 is	unable	 to	pay	 the	fine.	For	 these	
reasons,	 fines	 are	 often	not	 the	 sentences	 that	 ful-
fill	 the	 purpose	 of	 punishment	 (Nadrljanski,	Milić	
Žabljan	and	Gazivoda,	2012),	and	are	thus	avoided	
by	courts.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	the	legislator	
has	only	 foreseen	 this	 type	of	punishment	 for	 two	
crimes	of	corruption,	and	only	when	they	appear	in	
their	 lesser	 forms.	 This	 circumstance	 must	 surely	
have	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 frequency	with	 which	 this	
punishment	is	applied,	and	therefore	has	to	be	taken	
into	consideration.	
Even	 if	 our	 results	 cannot	 provide	 a	 basis	 for	
unequivocal	 conclusions	 about	 the	 adequacy	 of	
sanctions	 as	 special	 prevention,	 they	 can	 surely	
provide	a	basis	for	conclusions	about	the	adequacy	
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by	the	perpetrators	with	a	calculated	risk	of	punish-
ment,	which	are	common	in	a	particular	community,	




We	 can	 conclude	 that	 the	 aim	 of	 general	 preven-
tion	is	not	completely	fulfilled	in	this	case,3	which	
is	 noticed	 by	 the	 representatives	 of	 the	 judiciary	
themselves	 (Barašin,	 2009,	 in	 Matijević,	 2012).	
General	 prevention	 is	 primarily	 based	 on	 punish-
ment	(Milutinović,	1981).	A	rare	application	of	pun-
ishments	 for	 those	 crimes	of	 corruption	 for	which	
the	 law	 foresees	 harsh	 punishment	 also	 means	 a	
lenient	penal	policy,	 i.e.	minimal	 levels	of	general	
prevention.	If	the	application	of	sanctions	is	aimed	
to	 show	 to	 the	 potential	 perpetrators	what	 follows	
after	 a	 crime	 is	 committed,	 failing	 to	 apply	 these	
sanctions	is	also	a	failure	to	fulfill	a	general	function	
of	prevention	that	criminal	law	is	supposed	to	have.	
Related	 to	 that,	 Stojanović	 (2012)	 states	 that	 the	
punishments	 that	 are	not	 applied	have	no	general-
preventive	effect,	and	are	making	the	harshness	of	
the	legally	prescribed	sanction	rather	pointless.	
Avoidance	 of	 custodial	 measures	 can	 have	 a	
justification	 in	 the	 economic,	 penal,	 political,	 and	
other	senses,	but	it	should	not	be	forgotten	that	their	
alternatives,	 primarily	 the	 suspended	 sentence,	 are	
not	meant	 to	be	 their	 own	purpose,	 and	ought	not	
be	 taken	 lightly.	 To	 this	 we	 should	 add	 the	 posi-
tion	 expressed	 by	 Cvitanović	 and	 Glavić	 (2011),	
who	warn	that	an	“ordinary”	suspended	conviction	
(without	 other	 obligations	 that	 go	 along	 with	 it)	
often	carries	with	it	the	risk	of	being	understood	as	
the	 court’s	 plea	 to	 the	 perpetrator	 to	 abstain	 from	
such	behavior	in	the	future,	rather	than	as	a	punish-
ment	 for	 the	 committed	 deeds.	 That	 is	 why	 these	
authors	advocate	the	revitalization	of	the	suspended	
sentence	by	adding	to	it	some	new	obligations	and	
other	 repressive	 content,	 all	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 the	
greater	 likelihood	 of	 individualization	 of	 sanc-
tions.	When	 it	 comes	 to	 crimes	of	 corruption,	 this	
would	primarily	 include	 the	 restitution	of	 illegally	
acquired	economic	gains,	and	a	restitution	of	dam-
ages	caused	by	criminal	behavior.	
Our	 results	 also	 confirm	 the	 hypothesis	 that	
sentencing	 for	 criminal	 offenses	 of	 corruption	
is	 applied	 with	 punishments	 close	 to	 the	 legal	
minimum,	 and	 thus	 substantiate	 the	 findings	 by	
Đorđević	 (2012),	Maljević	 (2011),	 Stojanović	 and	
Kolarić	(2010).	It	appears	that	the	latter	two	thirds	
of	 the	 range	 of	 punishments	 is	 not	 used	 at	 all	 for	
the	said	felonies.	Though	this	should	be	judged	on	
the	basis	of	a	more	detailed	analysis	of	the	facts	of	
the	cases,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	believe,	 in	 the	words	of	
Jakulin	(2012),	that	all	corruption	crimes	discussed	
by	the	courts	fall	into	the	category	of	lesser	crimes	
whose	 perpetrators	 deserve	 a	 punishment	 at	 or	
below	the	legal	minimum.	This	is	particularly	obvi-
ous	when	taking	into	account	the	extent	of	guilt,	the	
motivations	 of	 offenders,	 and	 the	 extent	 to	 which	
the	protected	goods	and	values	are	threatened.
If	 we	 think	 of	 guilt	 as	 a	 subjective	 relation	 of	
the	perpetration	 towards	 the	 felony	which	consists	
of	 three	key	elements,	1)	 legal	 sanity,	2)	 intention	
or	 negligence	 and	 3)	 awareness	 of	 illegality,	 we	
may	 conclude	 that	 the	 level	 of	 guilt	 is	 generally	
high	 among	 offenders	 in	 this	 area	 of	 criminality.	











The	 courts	 have	 justified	 their	 decisions	 with	
numerous	extenuating	circumstances,	but	also	with	
near-nonexistence	of	 inculpating	circumstances.	 In	
a	 number	 of	 cases	 they	 used	 “ordinary”	 extenuat-
ing	circumstances	as	arguments	for	non-mandatory	
judicial	reduction	of	punishment,	as	was	discussed	
by	 Kos	 (2003),	 who	 warns	 of	 an	 existence	 of	 a	
nearly	 independent,	 isolated	 penal	 policy	 as	 prac-
ticed	by	the	courts,	which	ignores	the	legal	bound-





just	 ordinary	 circumstances	 that	 should	 be	 taken	
into	 account	 when	 deciding	 on	 punishment,	 and	
not	 exceptional	 extenuating	 circumstances,	 which	
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crime	 had	 been	 prescribed.”	 In	 this	 case,	we	may	
state	 that	 the	 penal	 policy	 of	 the	 relevant	 courts	




because	 they	 have	 been	 determined	 within	 the	
boundaries	of	law,	but	are	only	fully	legal	if	they	are	
individualized	 in	a	manner	 that	ensures	 the	 fulfill-
ment	of	the	purpose	of	punishment.	
It	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 penal	 policy	 of	 the	 courts	
depends	on	numerous	and	various	factors.	The	ques-
tion	of	the	reasons	for	a	lack	of	congruence	between	
the	 legislator’s	 and	 the	 courts’	 penal	 policy	 ought	
to	be	considered:	e.g.	is	it	the	case	that	the	legisla-





from	one	 to	 the	other,	as	suggested	by	 the	various	
proposals	for	the	solution	of	the	problem.	With	the	
aim	of	 neutralizing	 the	 disconnection	 between	 the	




at	 solving	 the	 problem	 which	 suggest	 a	 ban	 on	






confirmed	 in	 this	paper	 as	well.	The	 fact	 that	 per-
sonal	gain	is	the	most	common	motivation	for	these	
acts	 could	 lead	 us	 to	 expect	 that	 fines	 would	 be	
applied	as	 appropriate	punishments	 in	 some	cases.	
Nonetheless,	 the	courts	have	found,	unequivocally,	
that	 this	 sort	of	punishment	does	not	 contribute	 to	
the	fulfillment	of	the	aims	of	punitive	measures.	






that	 German	 courts	 had	 been	more	 strict	 than	 the	




was	 confiscated.	 Additionally,	 the	 courts	 posed	
additional	obligations	along	with	suspended	prison	
sentences	 in	 18	 cases,	 primarily	 the	 obligation	 to	
pay	a	certain	sum	of	money	to	institutions	of	general	
interest,	 as	 well	 as	 restitution.	 Bannenberg	 warns	
that	the	number	of	these	additional	conditions	may	
be	 greater,	 as	 many	 of	 the	 cases	 were	 concluded	
in	 negotiations	 on	 guilt,	 where	 one	 of	 the	 condi-
tions	was	 restitution	 in	 civil	 processes,	 or	 through	
voluntary	donations.	In	sum,	we	may	conclude	that	
the	German	 courts	 have	 given	 special	 attention	 to	
the	 essence	 of	 what	 corruption	 most	 commonly	
is	 about:	 material	 gain.	 Though	 their	 nature	 and	






role,	 such	measures	may	 contribute	 to	 the	 restitu-
tion	of	damage	and	can	hit	 the	 living	standards	of	
the	 offender,	 thus	 fulfilling	 both	 the	 general	 and	
particular	 preventive	 function.	 A contrario,	 if	 the	
perpetrators	are	allowed	to	enjoy	the	fruits	of	their	
criminal	activities,	and	if	the	total	reaction	of	soci-
ety	 is	 reduced	 to	 a	 warning,	 the	 message	 sent	 to	
the	offender,	and	to	the	rest	of	the	community,	can	













corruption,	 so	 that	 they	 consider	 a	warning	with	 a	
threat	 of	 punishment	 a	 sufficient	 sanction,	 in	 spite	
of	the	fact	that	the	legislator	has	disabled	the	option	
of	alternation	for	imprisonment	in	the	most	serious	
cases	 of	 corruption.	Nonetheless,	 regardless	 of	 the	
courts’	 own	 views	 on	 the	matter,	 the	 courts	 ought	
to	 follow	 the	 provisions	 of	 material	 criminal	 law,	
which	has	not	happened	in	a	number	of	cases.	Two	
explanations	 of	 the	 situation	 are	 possible,	 both	 of	
which	 stem	 from	 the	 verdicts	 in	 which	 the	 courts	
refer	to	particular	provisions	of	the	law	concerning	
the	selection	of	type	and	extent	of	the	penal	sanction.	
The	first	explanation	 is	 that	 the	courts	have	misin-
terpreted	the	provisions	on	reduction	of	punishments	
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fact	 that	 a	 sentence	of	 imprisonment	 that	 is	 longer	
than	 6	months	 is	 cited	 in	 full	 months,	 it	 becomes	
clear	 that	 there	 is	 a	 month’s	 difference	 between	
the	 aforementioned	 cases.	 The	 second	 explanation	
could	 be	 that	 the	 courts	 have	 been	misinterpreting	
the	provisions	on	 the	determination	of	 punishment	
for	 cases	 in	 which	 there	 is	 an	 agreement	 on	 the	
confession	of	guilt,	which	are	prescribed	in	the	Law	
on	Criminal	Procedure	of	the	Federation	of	Bosnia	
and	Herzegovina.	 In	 cases	where	 an	 agreement	on	
the	confession	of	guilt	 is	made,	this	law	allows	for	
a	reduction	of	the	prescribed	sentence,	in	both	type	







similar,	because	 the	 judicial	bodies	must	know	 the	
regulations	they	are	enforcing.	
It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 point	 out	 that	 these	 are	






cial	bodies	more	 inclined	 towards	 the	perpetrators.	









be	 considered,	 primarily	 by	 addition	 of	 repressive	






Security	 measures	 have	 only	 been	 applied	
in	 exceptional	 cases	 of	 criminal	 offenses	 of	 cor-
ruption.	This	information,	found	as	a	result	of	this	








the	 profession,	 activity,	 or	 function	 is	 the	measure	
expected	 for	 the	 types	 of	 felonies	 discussed	 here,	
along	with	the	measure	of	confiscation	of	the	object	
utilized	as	means	of	corruption.	Nevertheless,	when	
the	 true	 situation	 is	 surveyed,	 it	 becomes	 obvious	
that	 the	persons	committing	 the	offense	have	been	
in	 the	 lower	 ranks	 of	 the	 organizational	 hierarchy	
(Vujović,	2013),	which	 reduces	 the	purposefulness	
of	 the	measures.	Additionally,	most	 of	 the	persons	
involved	 had	 already	 lost	 their	 employment	 upon	
the	uncovering	of	 corrupt	practice,	which	can	also	
be	a	factor	in	the	court’s	decision	not	to	mete	out	the	
aforementioned	measures.	 It	 should	 also	 be	 added	
that	the	monetary	gain	from	corruption	is	most	com-




used	 at	 all	 when	 sentencing	 the	 perpetrators	 of	
crimes	of	corruption.	Even	though	it	could	have	been	
expected	that	 the	application	of	 that	measure	would	




and	after	2010,	 it	could	 replace	a	sentence	of	up	 to	
a	 year’s	 imprisonment.	 Thus	 a	 number	 of	 applied	
sentences,	which	were	 longer	 than	six	months	(or	a	







for	 community	 service	 (without	 imprisonment)	 for	
persons	who	 have	 committed	 crimes	 of	 corruption,	
and	 choose	 to	 apply	 suspended	 sentences.	Another	
issue	that	ought	to	be	taken	into	account	here	is	that	
community	 service	 cannot	 be	 applied	 without	 the	
offender’s	consent,	which	 is	 fully	 justified	from	the	
point	 of	 view	 of	 relevant	 international	 law	 (Tomić	
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and	 Manojlović,	 2012).	 Furthermore,	 there	 are	 no	




cation	 of	 this	measure,	 as	 discussed	 by	Bumči	 and	
Tomašić	(2006),	and	Škorić	and	Kokić	-	Puce	(2009),	





indeed	been	confirmed.	 It	has	been	 shown	 that	 the	
penal	policy	with	regard	to	corruption	has	been	mov-
ing	 towards	 less	 repression,	both	 in	qualitative	and	
quantitative	terms.	More	than	anything,	the	conclu-
sion	 is	drawn	from	the	 fact	 that	 the	perpetrators	of	
acts	of	corruption	are	rarely	facing	the	major	penal	
sanctions,	i.e.	imprisonment	and	fines.	On	the	other	




bidden	by	 the	Penal	Code.	Even	 though	 the	option	
was	 there,	 the	 courts	 failed	 to	 issue	 fines,	 even	 as	
secondary	 or	 auxiliary	 measures,	 while	 security	





in	 the	 area	 of	 corruption	 that	 tends	 towards	 less	




Political	 will	 is	 a	 necessary	 precondition	 for	 a	
successful	 fight	 against	 corruption,	 and	 it	 is	 pre-
cisely	 its	 absence	 that	 has	 been	 troubling	 Bosnia	
and	 Herzegovina	 for	 many	 years	 now	 (European	
Commission,	 2012).	 Unfortunately,	 politics	 and	
politicians	 are	 now	 interfering	 with	 ever	 more	
spheres	 of	 social	 life,	 often	 utilizing	 corruption	
as	 means	 of	 fulfillment	 of	 their	 aims	 (Tanjević,	
2011).	Thus	 the	 names	 of	 current	 political	 leaders	
of	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	have	been	found	on	the	
lists	of	defendants	in	the	most	serious	criminal	cases	
of	 corruption,	 though	 these	 cases	 have	 concluded	
with	decisions	that	found	the	defendants	not	guilty.	
It	 cannot	 be	 claimed	 that	 there	 had	 been	 political	
pressures	on	the	operation	of	the	judiciary,	but	this	




tion	 in	 the	 Federation	 of	 Bosnia	 and	 Herzegovina	
and	comparing	 them	to	 the	practice	of	courts	 in	 the	
Canton	Sarajevo,	this	paper	has	tried	to	consider	and	
question	 the	 congruity	 of	 legal	 and	 judicial	 penal	
policies	 in	 the	 area	 of	 corruption.	 The	 hypothesis,	
as	 found	 in	 the	 relevant	 literature,	 that	 courts	 tend	
to	 apply	 low	 levels	 of	 repression	 when	 choosing	
the	 type	and	extent	of	penal	 sanctions	has	been	 the	








The	 legislator	 has	 strongly	 condemned	 acts	 of	
corruption,	expressing	this	attitude	through	the	legal	
provisions	 containing	harsh	punishments	 for	 those	
who	commit	 such	acts.	The	courts	have,	however,	
used	 only	 the	 very	 minimum	 of	 repression	 that	
was	 placed	 at	 their	 disposal	 by	 the	 legislator.	 It	
was	thus	determined	that	the	the	courts	have	rarely	




thus	 be	 said	 that	 the	 penal	 policy	 of	 the	 courts	 in	
Canton	 Sarajevo	 has	 partially	 been	 contra legem. 





sanctions	 which	 include	 some	 temporal	 limitation	
on	the	rights	of	the	offender	were	applied	in	the	first	
third	 of	 the	 foreseen	 range,	 and	 often	 even	 below	
the	legal	minimum.	
In	 spite	of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 legislator	dedicated	
much	attention	to	fines	for	perpetrators	of	criminal	
acts,	carried	out	with	the	aim	of	personal	gain,	the	
courts	 have	 been	 reluctant	 to	 apply	 fines	 to	 those	
who	were	found	guilty	of	crimes	of	corruption,	and	
whose	motivation	was	clearly	that	of	personal	gain.	
Additionally,	 the	 courts	 have	 only	 exceptionally	









the	 penal	 policy	 of	 the	 courts	 is	 characterized	 by	
an	inclination	towards	less	repressive	measures.	In	
principle,	the	reasons	for	this	may	be	found	on	the	
legislator’s	 end,	 if	 it	 is	 the	 case	 that	 the	 legislator	
had	 foreseen	 sanctions	 which	 are	 too	 harsh,	 thus	


























were	 truly	 ordinary,	 and	 not	 exceptional,	 and	 as	
such	 did	 not	 warrant	 such	 reduction	 in	 punish-
ment;	c)	the	courts	neglected	some	aspects	of	penal	




and	 on	 the	 other	members	 of	 the	 society,	 then	 an	






very	 important.	 Here,	 a	 certain	 decisiveness,	 and	
even	a	harshness	in	sanctioning,	can	have	a	strong	
preventive	effect.	These	characteristics	are	not	nec-
essarily	 fulfilled	 by	 applying	 sanctions	 which	 are	
more	 harsh,	 but	 by	 a	 selection	 of	 such	 measures	
and	sanctions	that	send	a	clear	and	sufficient	mes-
sage	about	unacceptability	of	criminal	behavior	that	
stems	 from	 the	 desire	 for	 (illegal)	 material	 gains.	
These	measures	and	sanctions	include,	in	particular,	
fines,	 community	 service,	 and	 certain	 obligations	
















special	 and	 general	 prevention,	 and	 provision	 of	
satisfactory	 compensation	 to	 the	 victims	 of	 crime.	
Both	levels	of	prevention	largely	consist	of	express-
ing	contempt	for	the	offender’s	act,	and	in	the	case	
of	 general	 prevention,	 the	 aim	 is	 to	 select	 such	 a	
type	and	extent	of	sanction	that	would	psychologi-




by	 the	 court.	 It	 this	 balance	 is	 tilted,	 either	 in	 the	
direction	of	general	prevention,	or	 in	 the	direction	
of	special	prevention	(even	at	the	expense	of	legal-











area	 with	 a	 distinguished	 problem	 of	 corruption,	
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cution	 of	 offenders,	 finding	 the	 most	 appropriate	
types	 and	extents	of	 sanctions	 for	 crimes	 commit-
ted,	where	a	special	role	may	be	played	by	special	
obligations	(restitution,	payment	of	damages)	added	
to	 suspended	 sentences,	 community	 service,	 or	 a	
wider	application	of	fines,	becomes	an	indicator	of	
the	state’s	serious	commitment	 to	 the	fight	against	
corruption.	 It	 is	 precisely	 this	 will,	 exhibited	 by	






as	contributions	 to	our	 information	about	 the	need	
to	create	this	truly	necessary	will	to	act.	
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Appendix: A LIST OF ALL ANALYZED, LAWFULLY CONCLUDED COURT CASES 
Municipal	Court	in	Sarajevo
1. K61 05
2. K 4 05




7. K 217 05
8.	 K 217 07
9. K 305 06
10. K 360 05
11. K 404 06
12. K 405 05
13. K 425 07
14. K 469 04
15. K 476 07
16. K 537 05
17. K 700 05
18.	 K 719 07
19. K 900 04
20. K 931 07
21. K	984	04
22. K	984	07
23. K 991 04
24. K 997 07
25. K 1132 05
26. K 1175 05
27. K 1279 05
28.	 K 1300 07
29. K 1434 06
30. K	1482	06
31. K	1583	05
32. K 1602 06
33. K	1682	07
34. K	1830	07








43. K 70615 09





49. K 99769 09
50. K	113871	09
51. K 114752 09
52. K	118424	10
53. K 127075 05
54. K	128723	10
55. K	138127	10
56. K 139251 10
57. K 161795 10
58.	 K 162009 10
59. K 179370 10
60. K	188017	11
61. K 199233 11
62. K 211924 11
Cantonal	Court	in	Sarajevo
63. K 427 06
64. K	841	07
65. K 1 05
66. K 2 06
67. K 9 05
68.	 K 10 02
69. K 14 07
70. K 15 07
71. K 16 05
72. K	18	07
73. K 31 05
74. K 44 05
75. K 62 02
76. K 70 06
77. K 72 06




82.	 K 210 07
83.	 K	276	08
84.	 K	328	06
85.	 K 511 07
86.	 K	2471	08
87.	 K	2496	08
88.	 K 3594 09
89.	 K 3752 09
